In 2017, a new Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) was created to enable members of the national parliaments of the EU and the European Parliament to exercise joint oversight of the EU agency for police cooperation (Europol). This paper chronicles and explains the lengthy legal and political process leading up to the first meeting of the Europol JPSG in October 2017, and the establishment of its Rules of Procedure at its second meeting in March 2018. In addition, the Europol JPSG is compared to the three EU inter-parliamentary conferences (IPCs) which meet twice-yearly to discuss EU affairs, foreign policy and economic governance. While there are many similarities, the JPSG differs from these others in that it has an explicit mandate to scrutinize, and the target of its scrutiny is a specific EU agency rather than a whole policy field. The JPSG is also distinctive in a number of key respects, including a stronger legal basis, more restrictive membership and participation rules, greater continuity of membership, stronger access to EU officials and documents, a seat on the Europol Management Board and an explicit right to ask oral and written questions. Taken together, these attributes indicate that the JPSG is designed to be an oversight body, rather than merely a discussion forum. Finally, the paper considers the likely future UK role in relation to the Europol JPSG after Brexit.
Introduction
The Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) was created in 2017 to exercise oversight over the European Police Agency (Europol). It is the first of its kind, insofar as it is an interparliamentary body made up of members of the European Parliament (EP) and the national parliaments of the European Union (EU), with a legal mandate to scrutinize the activities of an EU agency. These attributes set it apart from the other EU interparliamentary bodies with a comparatively weaker legal mandate and a broader field of policy concern. It is also a unique arrangement in comparison to other EU agencies, which do not enjoy treaty recognition and are subject to weak oversight from the EP and individual national parliaments but not joint scrutiny from both.
The key question of this paper, particularly in the context of this special issue, is whether the JPSG for Europol represents a new form of democratic oversight in the EU.
More specifically, is it essentially similar to or qualitatively different from other forms of interparliamentary cooperation in the EU, in particular the three major Inter-Parliamentary Conferences (IPCs) -the COSAC Plenary, the CFSP-CSDP Conference and the SECG Conference. Early scholarly analysis is of varying opinion as to whether the JPSG 'represents a major step forward for interparliamentary scrutiny' (Kreilinger 2017: 15) or that 'it is to be expected that Europol does not have to fear direct consequences of this parliamentary scrutiny ' (Gless and Wahl 2017: 353) . Suspecting that the JPSG may be merely 'old wine in new bottles,' one observer noted that 'it may not be as different from the pre-existing interparliamentary conferences as one could have expected' (Fromage 2017).
Certainly, the Europol JPSG shares structural similarities with the three IPCs. The author has previously argued that the three IPCs share three attributes -they are EU-specific (in membership and policy focus), large (involving multiple participants from each parliament) and permanent (meeting twice-yearly rather than on an ad hoc basis) -which set them apart from other forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (which is not EU-specific), the EU Speakers Conference (which is small) or Inter-Parliamentary Committee Meetings (which are ad hoc) (Cooper 2019 (forthcoming)). By this measure, the Europol JPSG belongs in the same category of E -187 institution as the IPCs: its membership is comprised of EU parliaments meeting to discuss EU-related issues, it is large (albeit somewhat smaller than the three IPCs), and it meets on a regular, twice-yearly basis. However, a close examination of the Europol JPSG reveals a number of key differences from the three IPCs, all of which attest to the fact that it is explicitly mandated and designed not as a talking shop but as a scrutiny body. Taken together, these make the Europol JPSG different in kind from the IPCs. The argument here is that the Europol JPSG represents a genuinely new form of interparliamentary cooperation within the EU, based on an innovative model of joint parliamentary scrutiny.
This model need not be confined to the scrutiny of Europol or even the policy field of Justice and Home Affairs, but could serve as a template for the parliamentary oversight of other agencies and policy fields. It is a genuine innovation in the EU's system of multilevel parliamentary democracy (Cooper 2013) .
The paper is structured as follows. It begins (Section 2) with a discussion of the meaning of 'joint parliamentary scrutiny' that emphasizes the distinctions between parliamentary scrutiny and parliamentary control, and between joint scrutiny and dual scrutiny. With these distinctions in mind, it continues (Section 3) with a historical overview of how the debate over the parliamentary scrutiny of Europol has developed over time, from the moment of Europol's creation in 1999 up to the passage of the Europol Regulation in 2016. Next (Section 4) it describes the process that brought the JPSG into being, detailing the consultations that led to the establishment of the parameters for the JPSG at the EU Speakers Conference in Bratislava in April 2017, up to the final adoption of its Rules of Procedure at the second meeting of the JPSG in Sofia in March 2018. This is followed by a close comparison (Section 5) of the Europol JPSG to the three major IPCs.
It is argued that while there are a number of structural similarities, the Europol JPSG is a qualitatively different kind of interparliamentary body, with an explicit mandate to scrutinize and a specific object of scrutiny. In addition, it has a number of attributes each of which gives it stronger powers of scrutiny than those of the three IPCs. It has a stronger legal basis, more restrictive membership and participation rules, greater continuity of membership, the power to summon responsible EU officials, stronger access to documents, a non-voting seat on the executive body it oversees (the Europol Management Board), and an explicit right to ask oral and written questions. The paper continues with a brief note (Section 6) on the likely relationship between the post-Brexit UK parliament and 
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the Europol JPSG. In conclusion (Section 7), the paper explores whether the Europol JPSG could serve as a template for other institutions of joint parliamentary scrutiny.
What is Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny?
It will be argued below that what sets the Europol JPSG apart from the three IPCs is that it has an explicit mandate to conduct 'joint parliamentary scrutiny' of an EU agency.
But what does this mean, exactly? To explain, we must have a clear definition of 'parliamentary scrutiny,' which here is synonymous with 'parliamentary oversight' but very different from 'parliamentary control.' After that we must have an understanding of 'joint scrutiny,' as distinct from 'dual scrutiny.'
Parliamentary scrutiny may be defined as the actions taken by a parliamentary body when monitoring the activities of an executive authority within a political system. This deliberately loose definition employs generic terms -'parliamentary body' rather than 'parliament,' 'executive authority' rather than 'government,' 'political system' rather than 'state' -in order to make them applicable not only to domestic parliaments but also to inter-parliamentary bodies within an international organization such as the EU. By this definition the pre-1979 EP, which was not yet a proper 'parliament' as it was not directly elected and lacked substantial legislative power, nevertheless engaged in scrutiny activities vis-à-vis the European Commission that deserved the label 'parliamentary scrutiny.' Whereas some scholars define 'parliamentary scrutiny' more narrowly, this definition is deliberately broad in that it includes all actions taken by a parliamentary body in the course of monitoring all aspects and phases of the executive authority's activities, whether legislative or non-legislative, whether it involves policy-formulation or policyimplementation, or whether or not it involves public expenditure.
I
Probably the single most important scrutiny tool wielded by a parliamentary body is its right to put a question to the executive authority and, under normal circumstances, receive an answer. Such questions may be intended simply to extract information, but quite often their true purpose is to make a comment regarding a current policy issue. Parliamentary questions may be written or oral. Written questions, often submitted by rank-and-file backbench MPs, will generally receive an answer in writing; oral questions may be put directly to the representative of the executive, such as a government minister, during a E -189 parliamentary session. Often this representative will appear in the parliament, either in plenary session or before a committee, to make a policy statement followed by questions and debate, in which parliamentarians may ask about and/or state their views on the policy. In addition, the parliamentary body may pass a non-binding resolution in order to communicate its opinion to the executive body. Or it may issue a more formal report, a written document that investigates a policy question in greater depth, but the ultimate purpose of which is to exert influence over the executive authority.
Parliamentary control, by contrast, is the power to appoint, censure or remove the executive; whereas some analysts consider this to be an aspect of parliamentary scrutiny, here, following Wouters and Raube (2012), scrutiny and control are treated as two separate functions. Parliamentary scrutiny is the power to monitor the actions of the executive while it is in office; parliamentary control is the power to determine whether the executive authority holds office at all. In general, the tools of parliamentary control are 'hard' (e.g. votes of investiture, votes of confidence) whereas the tools of parliamentary scrutiny are 'soft' (e.g. questions and debates, resolutions). Often there is a close relation between the two, insofar as the parliament's power of scrutiny may be strengthened by the fact that it holds in reserve the power to sanction the executive. However, these two functions are separable, and they do not always coincide. A parliamentary body may exercise a scrutiny function even if it lacks a control function, such as is frequently the case for the upper house within a bicameral parliamentary system. In the same way, the inter-parliamentary bodies of the EU -including the three IPCs and the Europol JPSG -may conduct parliamentary scrutiny vis-à-vis EU executive authorities even though they lack powers of control over them.
II
It should be stated that the scrutiny function of any inter-parliamentary body vis-à-vis the EU executive is only supplemental to that performed by the EP and, to a lesser extent, individual national parliaments. Within the EU, the function of both parliamentary control and scrutiny is exercised mainly by the EP. Certainly, the function of control -the power to appoint, censure or remove the executive -is exercised largely by the EP, along with the Council and the European Council (Corbett et al. 2011) . In addition, the EP is also by far the dominant parliamentary body in terms of the exercise of scrutiny of the EU executive, for which it has a broad array of scrutiny tools at its disposal -written questions, oral questions and debates, resolutions and reports -which it uses extensively. National What, then, is 'joint scrutiny'? A system of joint parliamentary scrutiny is one in which two or more parliaments together monitor the actions of an executive authority. In the EU, this is when the EP and national parliaments together scrutinize the actions of an executive authority of the EU. This may be contrasted with a system of 'dual parliamentary scrutiny' characterized by a division of labour between the scrutiny function of various parliaments, in which the EP oversees the EU executive and, separately, national parliaments oversee their respective national governments. The role of an inter-parliamentary body is quite different within these two scrutiny systems. In the former, the inter-parliamentary body has a direct scrutiny function in that it is the instrument through which participating parliaments directly scrutinize the executive, whereas in the latter its scrutiny function is indirect, in that it merely a forum in which the various parliaments can exchange information and best practices to enable them to carry out their separate scrutiny functions.
In broad terms, in a system of joint scrutiny the inter-parliamentary body is an oversight body, whereas in a system of dual scrutiny it is a discussion forum (Cooper 2019 (forthcoming) ).
This distinction between joint and dual scrutiny helps to explain the qualitative difference between the Europol JPSG and the three IPCs. Only the Europol JPSG is explicitly mandated and deliberately designed to be an oversight body, whose express purpose is joint parliamentary scrutiny. The three IPCs do not have an explicit scrutiny mandate; instead, their purpose, as set out in their respective Rules of Procedure, is generally to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices in keeping with a system of dual, rather than joint, scrutiny.
III In reality, the role of the IPCs is ambiguous in this regard, in that they all to varying degrees function as oversight bodies as well as discussion forums. IV But as will be seen below, the Europol JPSG differs from these in that it has an explicit mandate to scrutinize.
The Question of the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Europol, 1999-2016
The 
The Establishment of the Europol JPSG: 2016-2018
The Europol Regulation was formally adopted on 11 May 2016 and was set to come into force on 1 May 2017. The regulation stated that scrutiny of Europol's activities would be carried out by a specialized JPSG, but it did not specify the structure of this body. 
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Plenary (12%), the 184-member CFSP-CSDP Conference (6%) or the unspecified number (approx. 200 members) of the SECG Conference (14%); rather, the large majority of respondents (60%) opted for none of these, instead preferring that the JPSG should have a new, yet-to-be-determined format. On (3) the question of the frequency, location and chairing of its meetings, opinion was also split over whether the JPSG should have one regular annual meeting in the EP, jointly chaired by the Presidency Parliament (PP) and the EP (22%), two jointly-chaired meetings per year, one in the EP and one in the PP (36%) two meetings per year hosted and chaired by the PP (20%), or other (22%). However, despite these indecisive results, the survey was a useful exercise in that it helped parliaments to eventually come to a consensus -as was the case, for example, regarding the frequency of meetings (two per year), as seen below.
Based on the results received in this consultation, the Troika Working Group produced a draft proposal setting out the following modalities for the JPSG: (1) its membership should be selected individually by each parliament/chamber, bearing in mind the need for substantive expertise or relevant committee membership; (2) the JPSG should be composed of 2 members per national parliament (one per chamber in bicameral parliaments) and six 6 MEPs, for a total of 62 members in EU-28; and (3) it should meet regularly once per year in the EP, co-chaired by the EP and the PP, with the possibility that an additional extraordinary meeting could be held in the PP if the co-chairs agree.
This draft proposal was debated at the ICM hosted by the LIBE committee in (The proposal to alternate meetings between the PP and the EP, which was eventually adopted, was similar to the arrangement for the SECG Conference, in which the EP and the PP respectively host the meetings in the first and second halves of the year.) This draft text received a number of further comments and suggested amendments. 
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-There is an obligation on all actors to act in good faith, and in line with the logic of the Treaties, and in line with the purpose of Article 88 TFEU and the Europol Regulation but there is no black-letter authority that absolutely rules in or rules out the full participation of the Danish Parliament in the JPSG. XIII The implication of this opinion is that the participation of the Danish parliament is a political decision to be made by the JPSG itself. Eventually, a compromise was reached at the second meeting of the JPSG, which adopted the Rules of Procedure that effectively excluded Denmark, but also agreed to create a working group within the JPSG to study the question of Danish participation. This working group was scheduled to meet during the third meeting of the Europol JPSG in Brussels on 24-25 September 2018; at the time of writing no decision had been made.
Comparing the JPSG with the Three IPCs: Stronger Powers of Scrutiny
At first glance, the JPSG has many structural attributes that make it similar to the three major IPCs (see Table 2 ). Each of the four is a large, twice-yearly meeting of members of EU national parliaments and the EP, that is chaired or co-chaired by the Presidency Parliament (PP) as part of a series of events known as the Parliamentary Dimension of the Council Presidency (Cooper 2017a: 243-245) . The participants are usually -but not necessarily -members of the relevant sectoral committee for the policy field under discussion at the meeting, i.e. EU affairs, foreign and defense policy, finance and economic policy, or justice and home affairs. In organizational terms, there is a certain variation among the four; in some respects the JPSG is an outlier, but not in a way that makes it qualitatively from the IPCs. For example, while there was initial discussion about making the JPSG dramatically smaller than the IPCs (about one-third the size) it has ended up being only somewhat smaller (about two-thirds). Another example is the role of the EP, which enjoys a special status in all four interparliamentary bodies, but to varying degrees.
Of the four, the EP probably has greatest influence within the JPSG: not only does the EP host of one of the two yearly meetings of the JPSG (like in the SECG Conference) but it is co-chair of both (including the one held in the PP), and MEPs are numerically over- 
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represented within it vis-à-vis national MPs (16 to 4) to a greater extent than in other IPCs (e.g. 16 to 6 in the CFSP-CSDP Conference). In other measures of its institutional strength and autonomy, the JPSG could be said to occupy a middle ground among the IPCs. The RoP explicitly endows the JPSG with a Presidential Troika, and that this should in turn provide the Secretariat for the JPSG. These provisions regarding the Presidential Troika and the Secretariat are stronger than similar provisions for the CFSP-CSDP Conference and the SECG Conference, and as such give the JPSG a greater degree of institutional continuity, but weaker than the provisions for COSAC, whose Secretariat also includes a Permanent Member. In addition, the RoP also recognizes that the JPSG may debate and adopt Summary Conclusions by consensus 'in principle,' which may be used as an oversight tool with respect to Europol; this puts the JPSG on a par with the CFSP-CSDP Conference, which adopts Conclusions by consensus, in a weaker position than COSAC, which can adopt its Conclusions (formally, the 'Contribution') by QMV when consensus is unobtainable, but in a stronger position than the SECG Conference, which rarely adopts Conclusions (Cooper 2019 (forthcoming) ). 
XIV
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However, there are other aspects of the JPSG which clearly set it apart from the three IPCs. These are notable, in that they all point in the same direction: they all, to some extent, have the effect of increasing the effectiveness of the JPSG as an oversight body.
Nine such contrasting attributes may be identified and enumerated here.
A Mandate to Scrutinize
Unlike the IPCs, the JPSG has a mandate specifically to conduct 'scrutiny' of Europol. This is evident not only in the fact that 'scrutiny' is in the body's name and that the treaty specifies that its purpose is 'scrutiny of Europol's activities.' The Europol Regulation states that the JPSG '…shall politically monitor Europol's activities in fulfilling its mission, including as regards the impact of those activities on the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons.' By contrast, the Rules of Procedure of the three IPCs do not state that their role is the direct scrutiny of EU institutions, but rather to provide a framework for 'the exchange of information and best practice(s).' They also state variously that the Conference's purpose is to enable 'a regular exchange of views' (COSAC RoP, Art. 1.1) and to 'contribute to ensuring democratic accountability' (SECG Conference RoP, Art. 2.1) in their respective policy fields.
The implication is that purpose of the IPCs is not direct scrutiny, but to assist individual parliaments in the separate performance of their scrutiny function, e.g. '…to enable national Parliaments and the European Parliament to be fully informed when carrying out their respective roles in this policy area' (CFSP-CSDP RoP, Art. 1.1). By comparison, the JPSG has a very specific mandate to directly scrutinize that is set out not in its RoP but in the Europol Regulation. In the terms set out in Section 2, above, the JPSG exercises 'joint scrutiny' whereas the IPCs facilitate a system of 'dual scrutiny'.
A More Focused Target of Scrutiny
The JPSG is unlike the three IPCs in that the target of its scrutiny is an EU agency rather than a policy field. COSAC's remit is broadest, as it is a forum for the general discussion of EU affairs. But even the other two IPCs have a much wider remit than the JPSG, because they are concerned with the broad policy fields of foreign and security policy (CFSP-CSDP Conference) and economic governance (SECG Conference), and the outer edges of these policy fields are not well defined (Cooper 2017a: 234-235) . There is 
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not currently an IPC for the whole field of justice and home affairs, even though, as noted above, such a body was proposed at the EUSC in 2014. Rather, the only new interparliamentary body in this whole policy field is the JPSG, despite the fact that the EU treaties call for interparliamentary scrutiny of at least one other EU agency (Eurojust).
Stronger Legal Basis
As mentioned above, the JPSG enjoys a stronger legal basis than the three IPCs, both and authorizes that procedures be laid down in EU regulations whereby national parliaments and the EP can engage in scrutiny of Europol's activities (Art. 88 TFEU). It was under the latter provision that the Europol Regulation (2016/794) was passed, which specifically authorized/mandated the creation of the JPSG. Probably it is this latter provision, which gives the JPSG not just a vague treaty basis but a specific legal basis in ordinary EU legislation, that most sets the JPSG apart from the three IPCs.
More Restrictive Membership and Participation Rules
The JPSG has more restrictive rules of participation and membership than the three 2.2). While many countries have concluded such agreements, only one EU member state has done so -Denmark. As for non-EU member states, the RoP state the following:
The JPSG may also decide to invite, on an ad hoc basis and for specific points on the agenda, observers from the list of international organisations or third countries with which Europol has concluded agreements.
Even in the case of third countries with an extremely close working relationship to Europol, such as Norway, their parliamentary representatives can only attend on an ad hoc, non-voting basis. Under the current rules, this will be also be the position of the postBrexit UK, once it has concluded an agreement with Europol.
Continuity of Membership
In order to fulfill its scrutiny function, the individual members of the JPSG should be experts in their field who attend on a regular basis. This would be an improvement on the IPCs, which are often attended by a somewhat haphazard collection of members from the participating parliaments -usually but not always from the relevant committees -who may or may not have participated in the last meeting. To this end, the RoP specifies: 
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Members of the JPSG shall be selected individually by each Parliament/Chamber, bearing in mind the necessity to ensure substance matter expertise as well as long-term continuity. Where possible, members of the JPSG shall be nominated for the duration of their parliamentary mandate.
There is no equivalent requirement in the RoP of the three IPCs. Ultimately it is up to each parliament to decide, by its own rules, who it chooses to send as representatives to international fora; therefore it is difficult for an interparliamentary body to set uniform rules of participation. At most, the RoP can only set out guidelines in this regard. Even so, the idea here is that the individual members of the JPSG would have substance matter expertise and be nominated and serve for long periods of time -which, if successful, would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the JPSG as a scrutiny body and its members' sense of collective identity.
Power to Summon Responsible EU Officials
It is customary for the three IPCs to be attended and addressed by top EU officials.
Normally each IPC will be attended by a representative of the Commission (typically, the Commissioner responsible for the policy field under discussion) and the Council (typically a senior minister of the member state holding the Council presidency) who will address the body and answer questions. However, sometimes for various reasons the officials in question will not attend or will send a video message; when this happens it annoys the assembled parliamentarians, who consider it of great importance that top EU officials 
Access to Documents
Another way that the JPSG differs from the three IPCs is that it has explicit rights regarding access to documents. While Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon entitles national parliaments to receive consultative, legislative and policy documents from the EU institutions, the IPCs as institutions have no such rights. The JPSG, by contrast, must receive from Europol a number of specific documents listed in the Europol regulation.
These include 'threat assessments, strategic analyses and general situation reports related to Europol's objective as well as the results of studies and evaluations commissioned by Europol,' as well as documents concerning administrative arrangements and multiannual programming, the annual work programme and annual activity report, and the evaluation report drawn up by the Commission. Europol must transmit these to the JPSG 'for information purposes… taking into account the obligations of discretion and confidentiality' (Art. 51 (3)). This list of documents is not exclusive; the JPSG may also request other relevant documents '…necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks relating to the political monitoring of Europol's activities' (Art. 51(4)).
A Seat on the Management Board
Another novel feature of the JPSG in comparison to the IPCs is that it can occupy a non-voting seat on the executive body that it is overseeing, i.e. the Management Board of 
The Right to Ask Oral and Written Questions
It is a normal occurrence at IPCs that EU officials will address the meeting and take oral questions from the assembled parliamentarians. However, this is not a formal requirement and the encounter is often styled as a 'debate' or 'exchange of views.' The JPSG formalizes the requirement that EU officials must answer the questions put to them by its members. Crucially, it also adds the proviso that representatives of Europol must also answer written questions that are addressed to them outside the framework of the meeting itself:
Members of the JPSG may address both oral and written questions to Europol. Written questions may also be asked outside the meeting framework and independently of items listed on the agenda and shall be answered within an appropriate timeframe.
[…] A further written reply can be requested in case the answer to an oral question is deemed insufficient.
This provision creates a mechanism for the oversight of Europol on an ongoing basis rather than merely during the twice-yearly meetings of the JPSG. This is important because the right of a parliamentary body to put questions to an executive authority and to receive an answer is arguably the most essential tool of parliamentary scrutiny.
Brexit and the Europol JPSG
The Europol regulation was negotiated and adopted prior to the UK's Brexit referendum, and it does not address the unforeseen circumstance of an EU member state becoming a 'third country.' The UK had enjoyed a unique outside-inside relationship with the AFSJ: in 2014 it exercised its block opt-out from police and criminal justice measures but selectively opted back in to many of them, including participation in Europol and Eurojust (Curtin 185). After the Brexit referendum, the UK government announced that it would opt in to the new Europol regulation and maintain its current access until it leaves the EU. However, the UK's future relationship with Europol after Brexit remains entirely unresolved: whereas the UK hopes to negotiate a new security treaty through which it will remain in Europol, the EU's chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has remarked that it is a 'logical consequence' of Brexit that the UK must leave Europol.
XIX
The UK's prospects appear difficult when compared to the countries in the closest analogous situation, Norway and Denmark. As a 'third country,' Norway's position in Europol is limited in comparison to that of EU member states, and the limited access it does enjoy is conditional on its continued close association with the EU through Schengen and the EEA. By contrast, Denmark is an EU member state but it ceased to be a member of Europol after a referendum in December 2015; Denmark managed to negotiate a continued close association with Europol but it does not have full membership -it no longer has a voting seat on the Management Board, for example -and even the 'third country' access it enjoys is conditional on its continued EU membership, Schengen participation and recognition of ECJ jurisdiction . By the same standard, it will be difficult for the UK to retain the level of access enjoyed by Denmark or even Norway, given that it is already outside Schengen and it has pledged to leave not only the EU but also the EEA and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
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the JPSG and is relegated to the status of a non-voting observer and cannot act as co-chair.
Yet even this status is privileged in comparison to that of Norway because, as an EU member state with an Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation, Denmark at least has an automatic right to attend, whereas Norway must be invited on an ad hoc basis.
If the rules remain the same, the post-Brexit UK would be in the same position as Norway, needing to receive an invitation in order to attend. This would be similar to the COSAC plenary, which is routinely attended by observers from the Norwegian parliament after they routinely send a letter requesting an invitation (Cooper 2015: 116) . It differs from the CFSP-CSDP conference, to which the Norwegian parliament has a right to send up to four observers -as will the UK parliament post-Brexit -because Norway is a European NATO member.
The likely exclusion of the UK from the JPSG is an unfortunate outcome, given the UK's extensive involvement in cross-border police cooperation; it is, for example, the second largest contributor to Europol information systems. 
Conclusion
The Affairs such as Frontex, the EU's border security agency. However, if such joint scrutiny bodies were to proliferate in this policy field, it might be suggested that they should consolidated into a full-blown IPC for the Justice and Home Affairs, as was proposed at the EU Speakers Conference in 2014. Another possibility is that, if the JPSG proves to be a success, it could provide a model for the three IPCs, prompting them to reorganize their efforts away from being discussion forums and more to being oversight bodies engaged in joint parliamentary scrutiny of the EU executive.
 DCU Brexit Institute, Dublin City University. I For a comparison of different definitions of parliamentary oversight, and an exhaustive list of parliamentary oversight tools, see Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) . II It is interesting to note that a previous draft of the Europol Regulation would actually have given the JPSG an element of parliamentary control -not just scrutiny -of the executive. The version of the legislation as amended by the EP in 2014 would have given the JPSG a say in, albeit not a veto over, the appointment/ approval of the Executive Director of Europol. It would have required that, in the case of a new appointment, candidates for the post of Executive Director appear before the JPSG at its request, and the same would apply to a sitting Executive Director whose term of office is to be extended. In addition, the Chairperson of the Management Board would have had to inform the JPSG before removing the Executive Director from office, as well as to the reasons for such a decision. However, these provisions were removed from the final version of the legislation, so that in the end the JPSG only received powers of scrutiny, not control, vis-à-vis Europol. 
